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magican is coherent. But ifno magicians exist, no possible object is a magican. 
This is a fine book and is strongly recommended for use in advanced courses 
in philosophy of religion. Dore proposes to meet the atheist on mutually acceptable 
ground and to serve as a guide through quite difficult paths of reasoning to the 
land of theism. Along the way, even if one finds himself thinking that a particular 
path doesn't quite lead to theism, one meets with a number of cogent philosophical 
arguments, careful distinctions and illuminating discussions. Anyone with a 
serious interest in philosophical theology should come to grips with this thoughtful 
work. 
Faith and Rationality: Reason and Belief in God, edited by Alvin Plantinga 
and Nicholas Wolterstorff. University of Notre Dame Press., 1983. 321 pp. 
Reviewed by STEPHEN WYKSTRA, Calvin College. 
In 1980-81, the Calvin Center for Christian Studies assembled a team to work 
"Toward a Reformed View of Faith and Reason"; whence these essays, by 
historian George Marsden, theologian David Holwerda, and philosophers William 
Alston, George Mavrodes, Alvin Plantinga, and Nicholas Wolterstorff. Not all 
these scholars are in the "Reformed tradition" of Calvin, Kuyper, and Bavinck; 
but each does care deeply about what this tradition offers current thinking about 
rationality and religious belief. This volume shows that it offers much, especially 
on something called "evidentialism." Wolterstorff, introducing the essays, says 
that in them "the evidentialist challenge of the Enlightenment is challenged and 
overcome." In this review I shall critically survey their counter-challenge. 
Plantinga's "Reason and Belief in God" amplifies almost everything he has 
written on evidentialism over the last seven years. Many charge that belief in 
God is irrational because there is insufficient evidence for it. Theists often respond 
with arguments for theism, but Plantinga's way is different: he challenges the 
underlying supposition-"evidentialism"-that theism needs evidence. Against 
all evidentialists-theists and nontheists alike-he urges that theistic belief "can 
be entirely right, rational, reasonable, and proper without any evidence or argu-
ment whatever." More technically, Plantinga holds that theism is "properly" 
believed in a "basic" way, rather like the way we believe that others have feelings, 
or that there is an external world. (Thus, when Plantinga says theism can be 
proper "without any evidence whatever," he uses "evidence" in a narrow inferen-
tial sense: in a wider sense that includes "non-inferential" evidence, the theism 
Plantinga commends is based on evidence-which he calls "grounds.") Plan-
tinga's first section, discussing Scriven, Flew, and other atheists, uses parallels 
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in moral theory to illuminate what it means to call a belief "rational." His second 
section, interweaving epistemology with discussion of Aquinas, aims to discredit 
evidential ism by exposing its roots in the epistemology of "strong found-
ationalism," which he criticizes at length. His third section elucidates the "Re-
formed" alternative, on which theism is properly produced by non-inferential 
"dispositions" implanted in us by God. On this view, rational God-beliefs are 
triggered by a variety of circumstances: looking at an intricate flower, we are 
disposed to believe that "God is to be praised for this"; or feeling guilty, that 
"God is angry at me for what I've done." (Such experiences are not "evidence" 
from which theism is inferred: rather, they "actuate" an appropriate non-inferen-
tial disposition, as hearing someone cry triggers belief that she feels pain.) Such 
basic beliefs self-evidently entail that God exists, so if they are proper, so is 
theism, as a quasi-basic belief. Plantinga aims less to establish this approach 
than to make it clear and plausible; his last section rebuts various objections 
against "Calvin ian basicalism" (as I shall call it). 
In "Can Belief in God Be Rational if It Has No Foundations?", Nicholas 
WQIt~rstorff agrees that evidentialism is discredited by its roots in an inadequate 
foundationalism; but Wolterstorff wants more: he wants an adequate criterion of 
rationality that will accredit Calvinian basicalism. Wolterstorff first analyzes 
what it means to be "rational": it means, he argues, "to do as well as can rightly 
be expected of one" in governing the processes by which one's beliefs are formed, 
sustained, and revised. Taking cues from Thomas Reid, Wolterstorffthen argues 
that "Reason" is but one in a rich complex of belief-forming dispositions which 
also includes the senses, memory, intuition, credulity, and so on. Reid's insight 
(I would give Hume credit for it) was that much epistemology since Descartes 
rests on the mistake of thinking that "Reason" can--Dr needs to--certify the 
reliability of these other belief-forming mechanisms. Our creaturely epistemic 
condition is that we must trust the basic belief-forming mechanisms with which 
we are endowed, presuming their reliability until we have reasons for revising 
them. Hence emerges Wolterstorff's "innocent until proven guilty" criterion: for 
any person's belief that p, the person is rational in believing that p unless he 
has (or ought to have) reason to cease believing that p. After refining this 
criterion, Wolterstorff uses it to accredit Calvinian basicalism-applying it not 
just to belief that God exists, but to beliefs about divine revelation! His target 
is Locke's insistence that we need evidence that a professed prophet is divinely-
inspired before accepting her teaching as God's Word. Since beliefs are innocent 
until proven guilty, Wolterstorff concludes that Locke was wrong: the onus was 
instead on Locke, to give evidence that cult prophet's claims are false. 
William Alston, in "Christian Experience and Christian Belief," seeks to eluci-
date how one class of religious experiences-the putatively "direct" (d-) experi-
ences of ordinary Christians-might justify one class of theistic beliefs, viz, 
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"m-beliefs" about God's self-manifestations in our lives. One approach would 
have us first construe any d-experience in an ontologically neutral way (e.g., as 
feeling a flooding sense of release from guilt), and then inferentially show, 
somehow, that such an experience warrants belief in a transcendent God causally 
"behind" the experience (e.g., that God is assuring me of his forgiveness). Alston 
rejects this inferential approach; his alternative develops the idea of "basic expe-
riential practices," by which we use ontological schemas to "directly objectify" 
our experiences, constituting them as experiences of what the schema posits. 
Whether a specific Christian m-belief is justified then hangs on whether a larger 
"Christian practice" (CP) is justified. Alston here illuminatingly distinguishes 
different concepts of justification as applied to "practices"; from the history of 
efforts to justify "perceptual practice" (PP) by which we objectify sense experi-
ence in terms of physical objects, he then argues that the reasonableness of a 
basic practice requires that it be "normatively justified," and this only in a weak 
sense: not that we have reasons to think it is reliable, but only that we lack 
reasons for thinking it unreliable. Does Christian practice meet this condition? 
The main alleged reasons for thinking CP unreliable involve its differences from 
PP; but Alston argues that these differences are not good reasons for thinking 
CP unreliable. Put briefly, his case is that if the reality with which CP purports 
to put us in touch is as CP says, we should expect CP to have those differences 
from PP. Last, Alston suggestively discusses what one might call the "axiological 
legitimation" of basic practices: unlike PP, the value of CP is not predictive 
efficacy, but transformation of persons into what (as CP construes it) God intends 
us to be. Hence, it is success in such transformation, not in prediction, that 
would be "the appropriate token of the reliability of Christian Practice." Assessing 
this, Alston concludes, requires that one "get inside" the practice. 
Now a brief evaluation of the essays by Plantinga, Wolterstorff, and Alston. 
Though each is distinctive, the essays show a powerful concinnity, bringing 
recent epistemological tools and historical insight to an approach to "religious 
epistemology" that has hitherto received little attention. Most remarkably, they 
do this with concern to illuminate the real life of Christian believing, not merely 
the "God ofthe philosophers." Refining and evaluating this approach will likely 
be a keen topic in philosophy of religion over the next decade. 
Do these essays, as WoIterstorff urges, "overcome the evidentialist challenge"? 
I think not, for it is unclear whether they have construed evidentialism in its 
most challenging form. Plantinga, for example, defines "basic" so as to include, 
as basic beliefs, those grounded in authority: evidentialism, as he construes it, 
thus extravagantly decrees that one could never be proper in believing theism 
via trust in authority. But evidentialists must allow that most scientific claims 
(e.g., that electrons exist) can be rationally believed in just this way, so one 
suspects this is not really what they mean to say about theistic belief. Perhaps, 
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more sensibly, they mean to say of theism just what most all of us would say 
of electron-theory: that it is in some sense "evidence-essential"-it is the sort of 
claim for which evidence must be available to the community of believers , though 
not every believer in that community need hold her belief via her own inference 
from this evidence. Construed in this more sensible way, evidentialism is stiII 
opposed to the Calvinian position; but the Calvinian case that evidentialism is 
"rooted" in strong foundationalism, as Plantinga and W oIterstorff make it out, 
looks very thin. Most of us, after all, hold a great many claims (that electrons 
exist, that the sun is larger than the moon, and so on) to be "evidence-essential": 
is our "evidential ism" about these things also rooted in strong foundationalism? 
If not, why should one charge this of one who holds, as "evidence-essential," 
the claims: (1) that this world is the creation of an all-powerful, alI-knowing, 
and wholly good Spirit; or (2) that the writers of the Christian Scriptures are 
divinely inspired? If we look closely at the sorts of considerations that can indict 
a belief, putting it in ostensible need of an evidential case, I think we will find 
that evidentialism about both (1) and (2) has roots more plausible than strong 
foundationalism. We should deal with these before tilting at strong found-
ationalism. 
One of the merits of Alston's essay is that it does deal with reasons for thinking 
"Christian practice" unreliable. But I think that Alston's approach also needs 
refining, in at least two ways. The first involves distinguishing two issues: (1) 
whether one needs to go through an "inferential justification" on each occasion 
that one applies the Christian schema to "objectify" one's experience?; and (2) 
whether the Christian schema needs an inferential case as a condition of its 
reasonable use as an "objectifying schema"? The key point here (made by Sellars 
in "The Language of Theories") is that even a theoretical schema (like that of 
modem astronomy) that clearly needs an inferential case can nevertheless be 
non-inferentially applied to "objectify" specific experiences as we look at the 
heavens. If this point is correct, it is much less clear whether the "inferentialist 
view" really conflicts (as Alston says) with the Christian's sense that we "directly 
experience God in our lives." For perhaps the Christian's sense of directly 
experiencing God commits us only to a "no" to (1), while the "inferentialist" is 
committed only to a "yes" to (2). [By reckoning with the distinction, Alston 
might profitably exploit his section on the axiology of practices as a response 
to (2), while leaving much else of what he says intact as a response to (1).] 
A second area for more work is evident if we contrast Alston's diffidence 
about what Christian beliefs can be "experientially" justified with the much 
bolder claims of Plantinga and W oIterstorff. Cautioning against trying to spin 
the whole of Christian doctrine from personal experience, Alston specifies some 
things that are not likely to be non-inferentially justified by "what happens when 
I am on my knees in my study": he includes here not only doctrines like that of 
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the Last Judgment, but even the doctrine that God made all things. But this 
makes unclear what he takes to be directly justified in the content of experiential 
m-beliefs. Consider the Christian's experience of assurance of Di vine forgiveness, 
non-inferentially justifying the m-belief that "God is assuring me of his forgive-
ness." One might (following Plantinga) think this m-belief self-evidently entails 
that "God the Creator of all things exists"; but this would require Alston to 
abandon his diffidence about experientially justifying the latter doctrine. 
From conversations, I think Alston might preserve his diffidence by suggesting 
that in the m-belief "God is assuring me of his forgiveness," the term "God" 
works as a proper name, and thus does not entail the latter doctrine about God. 
It is not clear how this would do justice to the Christian experience of divine 
forgiveness, which one would think is constituted as an experience offorgiveness 
from the One to whom (as Creator) I am ultimately responsible. Perhaps Alston 
would here need to allow that the doctrine that God is Creator, while needing 
inferential justification, can nevertheless be directly applied to objectify an experi-
ence-highlighting the need to distinguish the issues (1) and (2) above. In any 
case, a "proper name finesse" would leave unclear (until Alston says more about 
how proper names work) just what in an m-belief is being non-inferentially 
justified. It would also divide Alston (the token Anglican in this volume) from 
his Calvin ian brethren: for Plantinga's central thesis is that in contemplating a 
flower and the like, we are proper in believing theism in a basic (or quasi-basic) 
way-where theism is the claim that there exists an immaterial person "who is 
perfect in goodness, knowledge, and power," on whom "the world depends for 
its existence." For Plantinga, a "proper name finesse" would betray this central 
thesis. 
I turn now to the remaining essays. George Mavrodes, in "Jerusalem and 
Athens Revisited" and two marvelous "short stories," is the "evidentialist" in 
the volume, much more sympathetic than Plantinga and Wolterstorff to the 
traditional enterprise of "positive apologetics"-giving reasons to believe. In 
ways defying brief summary, his essay and stories make very telling points about 
the Calvinians' proferred reasons for slighting apologetics, describing the enter-
prise and its rationale so as to secure its legitimacy. His essay thus greatly helps 
one puzzle out the relation between Calvinian basicalism and Christian apologe-
tics. In one respect, however, he may oversimplify. His essay contrasts two 
views: one sees as "unnecessary and useless," and the other as "necessary and 
useful," the apologist's enterprise; he also says that Calvinians think "we cannot, 
or should not, produce a positive argument" for theism (in response to claims 
that theism is false). But there are three issues here, not one: whether the proving 
enterprise is possible (or likely to succeed), whether it is "useful" or "permissible," 
and whether it is "necessary." Calvinians have perhaps addressed the first two 
issues, but not (so far as I can see) anywhere in this volume, so peripheral are 
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they to their main thesis. That thesis is not that one cannot provide a good 
argument for theism, nor that one should not, but that one need not: the rationality 
of theistic belief--or even its being a matter of knowledge-in no way depends 
on it. The main Calvinian thesis thus does not deny what Mavrodes affirms, 
making much shorter the distance between Mavrodes' Athens and the Calvinian's 
Jerusalem. 
George Marsden contributes "The ColIapse of American Evangelical 
Academia." In 1875 evangelical thought dominated academia; by 1950 it was 
almost totally routed. Why? Marsden's opening suggestion is that American 
evangelicals embraced the first (Newtonian) scientific revolution without exam-
ining its presuppositions: failing to see that these presuppositions "hid massive 
forces potentially in conflict with Christianity, they were unprepared when these 
forces erupted in the 'second' scientific revolution-that of Darwin." From this 
opening suggestion, Marsden quickly shifts to how evangelicals adopted Thomas 
Reid's epistemology as the basis both of objective apologetics and objective 
science: evidential apologetics, using one set of common sense "first principles," 
could demonstrate God's existence (via arguments from design) and the truth of 
Christian revelation (via historical testimony to the resurrection and moral evi-
dences); science, using other "first principles" of inductive and causal reasoning, 
could establish truths about nature. Since the two enterprises apply different first 
principles to different ranges of experience, they are autonomous; but since both 
yield "objective truth," they will nevertheless give harmonious results. This 
approach was disastrous, Marsden thinks, for two reasons. First, Reidians failed 
to see that the "first principles" of their apologetics rested, not on "common 
sense," but on a tacit theistic metaphysic: once this was abandoned, the principles 
lost alI force, and "rational apologetics" was no longer convincing. Second, 
Reidians failed to see that falIenness introduces into scientific theorizing a sub-
jectivity concealed by the Reidian ideal of neutral, objective, and autonomous 
"scientific method." In accepting Reid's views, Marsden concludes, evangelicals 
failed to see that Christians should begin with (rather than argue for) the "data 
of revelation," and should use revealed doctrines as "control beliefs" in their 
scientific theorizing. Marsden contrasts this failure with the Dutch Kuyperian 
tradition; he also tries to incorporate some virtues of evangelicalism into 
Kuyperianism, to avoid both a complete rejection of evidential apologetics, and 
an all-out warfare between two incommensurable kinds of science. 
Though challenging and interesting, Marsden's case seems to me flawed in 
several related ways. First, it's not clear that one can attribute the Darwinian 
episode to tacit "anti-Christian" presuppositions hidden in the Newtonian revo-
lution: Marsden's few paragraphs on these presuppositions ignore everything 
recent history and philosophy of science reveals about Newton's and Darwin's 
presuppositions. It is also unclear how Marsden means to relate the evangelicals' 
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acceptance of allegedly Newtonian presuppositions to their reliance on Reid. It 
would be one thing to say that reliance on Reid misrepresented the real presup-
positions of Newtonian science. But Marsden's idea seems different and more 
dubious: that Reid's thought was itself (as Reid imagined) the essence of Newton, 
so that in imbibing Reid, evangelicals were swilling Newtonianism. Second, 
Marsden doesn't consider the possibility that the argument from design lost hold 
simply because Darwin, for the first time in the history of science, provided a 
scientifically plausible alternative account of organic "contrivances." And third, 
Marsden seems unaware that by the mid-19th century, Reid's conception of 
scientific method had been largely abandoned by scientists. Reid (taking cues 
from Newton's Principia) confined science to inductive extrapolation from 
observables: hypotheses concerning unobservable "micro-entities" were Cartesian 
folly. But by the mid-19th century, this "chaste inductivism" had been (in science 
if not in seminaries) widely and explicitly rejected: with cues from Newton's 
Opticks, it was superseded by "the method of hypothesis," allowing scientists 
(like Lyell and Darwin) to invent imaginative hypothetical models, and then 
assess them by various criteria of hypothesis-testing. 
These three things suggest a very un-Marsdenian story of why Reidian evangel-
icals were unprepared for Darwin. While scientists, convinced theories of origins 
must be assessed like other scientific hypotheses, struggled to comparatively 
assess Darwin's theory and the Design-hypothesis in terms of prevailing criteria 
of hypothesis-testing, Reidians continued to invoke a Reidian inductivism long 
after most scientists had (rightly) consigned it to the methodological scrapheap. 
They simply assumed that hypotheses have no place in science, and that we 
have a common-sense faculty by which they can simply "see" that certain things 
in nature must be the result of "design" by an intelligent Maker. One thus needn't 
invoke allegedly anti-Christian forces hidden in Newtonian presuppositions to 
explain why reliance on Reid exiled evangelicals to academic Siberia. Of course, 
this way of seeing the story has one problem Marsden's does not: it leaves us 
with no easy suggestions about how (or whether) to challenge evolutionary theory. 
Last, Holwerda discusses "Faith, Reason, and the Resurrection" in the theology 
of Wolfhart Pannenberg. Philosophers interested in evidentialism should not 
neglect this theological essay: within the theological establishment over the past 
decades, Pannenberg has single-handedly gotten a hearing-in Germany, no 
less-for some most unfashionable propositions: that the Resurrection (in some 
full-blooded sense) of Jesus actually occurred; that its occurrence (and meaning) 
can be known by historical evidence; and that Christian faith (qua trust) rests 
on such knowledge. Pannenberg's "evidentialism" provides an area of contact 
between philosophy and theology, too often insulated from each other: it hence 
is a great service to have, in this volume, Holwerda's theological elucidation of 
the background, significance, and themes of Pannenberg's thought. Holwerda's 
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criticisms of Pannenberg will, to philosophers, perhaps seem to rest too often 
on slogans ("reason is not autonomous") and conflation of normative and 
psychological issues; but they nevertheless do manage to identify some very 
important issues at the interface of theology and philosophy, firmly linking 
Holwerda's essay with the rest of this volume. 
An Essay on Free Will, by Peter van Inwagen. The Clarendon Press, 1983. 
Pp. vi, 248. $29.95. 
Reviewed by ROBERT AUm, The University of Nebraska, Lincoln. 
This book is a detailed and rigorous study of the relation between freedom and 
determinism. It provides a conception of what constitutes freedom, and it carefully 
characterizes determinism. It critically assesses fatalism, proceeds to develop 
and defend three arguments for incompatibilism (the view that freedom and 
determinism are incompatible), and then sets out and assesses three arguments 
for compatibilism. Next, van Inwagen considers what it would be like if deter-
minism should be true and we did not have free will; and he concludes with a 
number of general points about the traditional problem of free will and deter-
minism. In what follows I shaH first briefly indicate some of his main theses 
and arguments and then comment on a few controversial points. The book offers 
many important conceptions, distinctions, arguments, and ideas. I shaH thus 
have to be highly selective in describing its content and mainly suggestive in 
assessing its case for incompatibilism. 
The first chapter introduces the main issues and provides useful definitions. 
For instance, determinism, the view that "the past determines a unique future," 
is distinguished from the Principle of Universal Causation, the claim that "every 
event (or fact, change, or state of affairs) has a cause (2-3); and soft determinism 
is distinguished clearly from compatibilism: it is determinism conjoined with 
compatibilism (and hence does not entail that there is free will-a point often 
missed in discussions of the issue). We are also given a sense of how freedom 
is to be conceived and of why one might regard it as incompatible with deter-
minism. 
Chapter II assesses some significant arguments for fatalism, which claims that 
no one is able to act otherwise than he in fact does. Here van Inwagen usefully 
distinguishes (as treatments of fatalism have not generaHy done) what is strongly 
inevitable, i.e., such that it would happen no matter what one did (25) from 
what is weakly inevitable, i.e., not strongly inevitable, but such that if one tried 
to prevent it one would take the wrong measures, and it is strongly inevitable 
